Manchester Community Schools just appointed its second superintendent in barely a year — promoting an internal principal after the last one walked — while the Army awarded a Texas contractor up to $10 billion over 26 years to run helicopter pilot training. Two institutions, same rule: the bureaucracy always gets paid, even when the mission fails.
The real story in both cases isn't who got the job or who won the contract. It's that government monopolies — whether a small Michigan school district or the entire Army aviation training apparatus — never shrink. They shuffle chairs, rename programs, hire contractors. Accountability never arrives, and the ordinary American picks up the tab.
Manchester's board of education selected Tom Johns, currently principal at Riverside Intermediate School, as the district's next superintendent this week. Johns replaces Steven Head, who announced his resignation in July citing health concerns — just over a year after he was hired, according to MLive Michigan.
The board interviewed exactly three candidates for the top job. All internal. All already on the district payroll. The other candidates were Widad Luqman, principal at Klager Elementary and director of the Manchester Early Childhood Center, and Nabil Nagi, director of special programs. The board didn't look outside.
Board President Sandra Wiitala called it "an exciting new chapter for our district" and praised the "talented and dedicated leaders" already inside the system. "Their willingness to pursue this important leadership opportunity speaks to the strength of our organization and their commitment to Manchester," Wiitala said in a statement.
MLive framed the story as a straightforward personnel announcement, burying the more telling detail: the last superintendent lasted barely 12 months, and the board responded by closing the search to outsiders entirely. The last time, Head was selected from external candidates after two rounds of interviews. This time, the monopoly circled the wagons.
Meanwhile, the Army made a much larger — but structurally identical — bet on the bureaucratic class. Breaking Defense reported the Army selected M1 Support Services, a Texas-based aviation training company, to lead its Flight School Next initiative, a contract worth up to $10 billion over as many as 26 years.
The program overhauls how the Army trains helicopter pilots. The current system uses Airbus UH-72 Lakotas at Fort Rucker — advanced aircraft with heavy automation that Army officials say became a crutch for new pilots who should be learning basic stick-and-rudder skills first. Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, commanding general of the Army Aviation Center of Excellence, said Flight School Next "delivers new military helicopter pilots with far better foundational skills."
The fix? Hand the whole thing to a private contractor. M1 will operate on a contractor-owned, contractor-operated model — meaning the Army won't even own the aircraft. M1 plans to use Robinson Helicopter's R-66, a simpler airframe that, as of last fall, wasn't even certified for Instrument Flight Rules. It's unclear if that's changed.
Follow the money: M1 is partnering with General Dynamics Information Technology — a subsidiary of one of the largest defense contractors on the planet — plus Quantum Helicopters and the University of North Dakota Aerospace Foundation. The prime contractor owns the assets, runs the training, and collects the checks for up to three decades. The Army keeps "oversight" — the same oversight that produced the current system's failures.
Breaking Defense reported the contract details straight, but the larger question went unasked: why does the Army need a 26-year contract to teach pilots to fly? What's the exit? As always with these arrangements, there isn't one.
Manchester schools couldn't keep a superintendent for a year, so they promoted from the same bench. The Army couldn't train pilots on sophisticated aircraft, so it's handing the job to a private firm for a generation. In both cases, the people who depend on these institutions — students who need to learn, soldiers who need to fly — are told to trust the process. The process is the problem.








